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Abstract 
We draw on recent accounts of social epistemology to present a novel account of epistemic 
cognition that is ‘socialised’. In developing this account we foreground the: normative and 
pragmatic nature of knowledge claims; functional role that ‘to know’ plays when agents say 
they ‘know x’; the social context in which such claims occur at a macro level, including 
disciplinary and cultural context; and the communicative context in which such claims occur, 
the ways in which individuals and small groups express and construct (or co-construct) their 
knowledge claims. We frame prior research in terms of this new approach to provide an 
exemplification of its application. Practical implications for research and learning contexts 
are highlighted, suggesting a re-focussing of analysis on the collective level, and the ways 
knowledge-standards emerge from group-activity, as a communicative property of that 
activity. Keywords: epistemic cognition; epistemological beliefs; collaborative 
learning; dialogue; discourse; sociocultural theory; social epistemology; epistemology; 
philosophy; discursive psychology;  philosophy of education 
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1. Introduction 
Epistemic cognition, under its various labels, has been much discussed within the 
field of educational psychology over the last 30 years. In part, this discussion has had in its 
sights the very nature of the construct: just what is epistemic cognition?; how should it be 
conceptualised?; under what conditions is it brought to bear?; and so on. We welcome the 
recent calls for consideration of the philosophical literature regarding epistemology in the 
conceptualisation of epistemic cognition. However, we highlight a gap in these recent 
analyses: the consideration of philosophical accounts of social and virtue epistemology, 
accounts which we argue motivate a greater consideration of the social, dialogic, and 
normative nature of epistemic cognition. Such a consideration necessitates a discussion of 
sociocultural and discursive perspectives on learning, which in turn underpins our distinctive 
socialised account of epistemic cognition. This paper thus sets out what a sociocultural 
account of epistemic cognition informed by social epistemology might look like. The aim of 
the paper is not to argue for or provide new empirical evidence supporting that particular 
stance on epistemology, or indeed for its application in epistemic cognition; rather, it aims to 
provide a starting point in a socialised description of epistemic cognition. Despite the social 
nature of our account, it nonetheless warrants consideration as a perspective on epistemic 
cognition insofar as it takes as its target the constructs of existing models, intending a re-
specification of these rather than a rejection of them. Epistemic cognition is thus seen not as 
some set of underlying traits, beliefs, attitudes, or cognitive-constructs, but in the everyday 
talk of people as they go about various (epistemic) tasks; a position aligned well with social 
epistemology. We thus address the questions: (1) “How would an account of epistemic 
cognition drawing on social epistemology be conceptualised?”; (2) “How does a social 
account of epistemic cognition frame existing work?”; (3) “What are the methodological 
implications of an account of epistemic cognition that draws on social epistemology?”. 
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In the rest of this paper we will first introduce a broad classic account of epistemic 
cognition, before going on to outline recent conceptual developments in epistemic cognition 
research. Addressing the question “How would an account of epistemic cognition drawing on 
social epistemology be conceptualised?” we then introduce an account of social 
epistemology, which we use to motivate our socialised account of epistemic cognition. We 
argue that our account provides a novel perspective on the existing body of epistemic 
cognition research. It is novel, insofar as it is fundamentally pragmatic, normative, and social, 
taking as its primary focus the ways in which people make and make-sense-of knowledge 
claims. However, in addressing the question “how does a social account of epistemic 
cognition frame existing work”, we will argue that this account aligns with existing research 
agendas in that its focus is on the ways we refer to, and make use of, epistemic language–in-
action. We follow in the tradition of discursive psychologists (Edwards, 2005; Potter & 
Edwards, 1999) in respect of ‘re-specifying’ traditional cognitive constructs through the 
analysis of language-in-use. That is, we describe epistemic cognition not in terms of 
underlying cognitive constructs, but in terms of how such constructs are implicated through 
language use in salient contexts. In the penultimate section we frame established empirical 
work in the recent epistemic cognition literature in terms of our socialised account, before 
concluding by drawing comparison between the socialised account we propose and existing 
cognitivist models of epistemic cognition.  
1.1 Classic Conception of Epistemic Cognition 
An increasing body of research explores epistemic cognition: the ways in which 
learners conceptualise knowledge and coming to know (for an early review, see Schraw, 
2001, and more recently, 2013). Across this body of work, an array of labels has been used, 
variously: epistemological beliefs (Schommer, 1990); epistemic beliefs (Schraw, Bendixen, 
& Dunkle, 2002); epistemological understanding (Kuhn, Cheney, & Weinstock, 2000) or 
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thinking (Kuhn & Weinstock, 2002); personal epistemology (Hofer & Pintrich, 2002); 
epistemic commitments (C.-C. Tsai, 2001; Zeineddin & Abd-El-Khalick, 2010) or in related 
work, information commitments (C.-C. Tsai, 2004; Wu & Tsai, 2005); and epistemic 
cognition (Kitchener, 2002) which Greene, Azevedo, and Torney-Purta (2008) suggest is 
adopted as the overarching term for this array of labels. This research has explored epistemic 
cognition in various contexts, including as related to task-understanding and completion 
(Bromme, Pieschl, & Stahl, 2009); in multiple document processing tasks (see Bråten, 2008 
for a review of the relevant literature to 2008); conceptual change research (see, Murphy, 
Alexander, Greene, & Edwards, 2007); lifelong (Bath & Smith, 2009) and workplace 
learning (Bauer, Festner, Gruber, Harteis, & Heid, 2004); physics (see, for example, Hammer 
& Elby, 2003; Scherr & Hammer, 2009) science generally (see, for examples, Colvin, 1977; 
Hutchison & Hammer, 2010; Lin & Tsai, 2008; C.-C. Tsai, 2001), and history learning 
(Forsyth, 2014; Maggioni & Fox, 2009); and the role and nature of teacher epistemic 
cognition (Hong & Lin, 2010; Maggioni & Parkinson, 2008; Mohamed, 2014; Schraw & 
Olafson, 2003; P.-S. Tsai, Tsai, & Hwang, 2011).  
Across the various models of epistemic cognition, there is broad agreement on two 
main areas for study, outlined by Mason, Boldrin, and Ariasi (2009) namely: What 
knowledge is, and how one comes to know: 
There are two dimensions within the first area (knowledge): 
- Certainty of knowledge: the degree to which knowledge is conceived as 
stable or changing, ranging from absolute to tentative and evolving 
knowledge; 
- Simplicity of knowledge: the degree to which knowledge is conceived as 
compartmentalized or interrelated, ranging from knowledge as made up of 
discrete and simple facts to knowledge as complex and comprising 
interrelated concepts. 
There are also two dimensions which can be identified within the second area 
(knowing): 
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- Source of knowledge: the relationship between knower and known, 
ranging from the belief that knowledge resides outside the self and is 
transmitted, to the belief that it is constructed by the self: 
- The justification for knowing: what makes a sufficient knowledge claim, 
ranging from the belief in observation or authority as sources, to the belief 
in the use of rules of inquiry and evaluation of expertise 
(Mason, Boldrin, & Ariasi, 2010, p. 69) 
An array of empirical approaches has been taken to epistemic cognition, with 
interview schedules (Barzilai & Zohar, 2012; Mason et al., 2010), think-aloud protocols 
(Barzilai & Zohar, 2012; Ferguson, Bråten, & Strømsø, 2012) systematic observation (Scherr 
& Hammer, 2009); and a number of survey instruments developed and deployed. Research 
studies typically rely upon self-report data or/and laboratory studies. However, three common 
survey instruments have been criticised for their psychometric properties (DeBacker, 
Crowson, Beesley, Thoma, & Hestevold, 2008) while, for example, concerns have been 
raised around the activation of metacognitive practices in the use of think-aloud protocols or 
their potential to distract from activity (see for example, Branch, 2001; Schraw, 2000; Schraw 
& Impara, 2000), and generally task designs abstracting individuals from social contexts (for 
exceptions, see ‘Evidence for a Socialised Account of Epistemic Cognition’).  
2. Recent Developments in Epistemic Cognition Research 
Perhaps because of this array of research applications, conceptual labels, and 
methodological approaches – including their various advantages and disadvantages – there 
has been some concern regarding the nature of epistemic cognition as a construct. Since its 
inception in developmental-stage terms (Perry, 1970) there has been concern to specify 
components of epistemic cognition (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Schommer, 1990), the domain 
specificity or generality of those beliefs (Hofer, 2006; Muis, Bendixen, & Haerle, 2006) and 
generally to develop conceptual models to characterize differing epistemic beliefs across 
contexts in terms of their sophistication. Additionally, some have argued that greater attention 
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should be given to the distinction between epistemic and ontological cognition (Greene et al., 
2008; Schraw, 2013), and more generally there have been calls for a philosophical approach 
to conceptualising epistemic cognition (Alexander, 2006; Chinn, Buckland, & 
Samarapungavan, 2011; Greene et al., 2008; Muis et al., 2006).  
However, this recent interest has tended, (perhaps in deference to existing models of 
epistemic cognition and their successes in identification of individual differences, and 
perhaps also because the literature in philosophical epistemology is expanding rapidly), 
towards a narrower focus on the philosophical literature than that literature offers. In 
particular, it has tended to emphasise: classical models of reasoning or evidentiary standards 
(for example rationalism, empiricism); analytic epistemology, emphasising justified true 
belief (JTB) and the commensurate need for an account of ‘justification’; and individualised 
accounts of ‘knowing’ in which the agent is an individual knower, abstracted from their 
social context. In so doing, recent work in social epistemology is overlooked. 
Thus, while Greene, Azevedo and Torney-Purta (2008) discuss the philosophical 
literature in the context of epistemic cognition research, they explicitly focus on ‘classical’ 
notions of epistemology in which ontology (the study of the nature of being) is seen as 
distinct from epistemology (the study of the nature of knowledge) while recent pragmatic 
epistemology might reject such a distinction (see, for example, discussion of metaphysics in 
Hookway, 2015). Similarly, a comprehensive timeline of philosophical approaches to 
epistemology is given in Muis, Bendixen and Haerle (2006). These authors' attempts to relate 
particular epistemologies with domains – empiricism with science, rationalism with 
mathematics – are made as a means to explore the domain specific epistemic stances. Here 
they note that it is challenging to generate domain-general, and cross-domain-comparative 
measures of epistemic cognition and that an analysis of domain practices is of interest 
precisely because those domains hold normative, socially contextualised epistemic stances. 
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Muis, Bendixen and Haerle’s (2006) suggestion, then, of a sociocultural approach to 
understanding epistemic cognition, might be taken to indicate a commitment to analysis of 
domain context in understanding domain-epistemologies, but not necessarily a commitment 
to sociocultural methodologies or their associated epistemological commitments. That is, it is 
a recognition that disciplinary context matters, but one which focuses on individuals (in 
abstracted disciplinary contexts), rather than the sociocultural pragmatic concern with sets of 
individuals as parts of those contexts, as simultaneously comprising and being comprised by 
their sociocultural context.  
Indeed, with regard to context sensitivity Chinn, Buckland and Samarapungavan note: 
“judgements of whether dispositions such as open-mindedness should be regarded as an 
epistemic virtue or vice can vary according to the context” (Chinn et al., 2011, p. 156). In 
their exploration of recent philosophical epistemology, they note the increased focus in the 
literature on ‘testimony’ as a source of knowledge; noting that this facet of coming to know is 
largely ignored or rejected by epistemic cognition literature which has tended to view a 
reliance on testimony qua ‘given’ ‘authority’, or ‘self-experience’ as maladaptive. This shift 
to readmit the notion of testimonial knowledge is also reflected in some recent psychological 
literature which notes the importance of ‘believing what you’re told’ in many contexts, 
including in educational contexts (see, for example, Harris, 2012; and the interesting 
discussion of children’s belief in testimony in Clément, 2010). Chinn, Buckland and 
Samarapungavan thus propose a model which, “differs from the current prevalent 
conceptualization of the structure of knowledge” (Chinn et al., 2011, p. 150) in proposing a 
multi- rather than uni-dimensional structure of knowledge, and in emphasising “some more 
specific structural forms such as mechanisms and causal frameworks” (Chinn et al., 2011, p. 
150). In doing so, they extend the current focus of epistemic cognition on facets ‘2’ and ‘3’ of 
the five facets that they identify, summarised thus: 
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1. Epistemic aims and epistemic value – what is the aim of knowledge work, and what is 
its value? 
2. The structure of knowledge and other epistemic achievements – is knowledge and its 
aims complex or simple? 
3. The sources and justification of knowledge and other epistemic achievements, 
together with related epistemic stances – where does knowledge originate, and what 
reasons are good warrants for knowledge claims? What stances can one hold towards 
knowledge claims (true/false, tentative belief, entertained possibility, etc.)? 
4. Epistemic virtues and vices – the sorts of praiseworthy dispositions (virtues), and 
dispositions likely to hinder achievement of epistemic aims (vices) 
5. Reliable and unreliable processes for achieving epistemic aims – what processes does 
a student hold as good for developing knowledge? 
As a corollary to this expansion, and their concern that judgements regarding 
epistemic vice and virtue remain context sensitive, they propose a shift from questionnaires to 
interviews and observations, suggesting that such methods might explore the “reliable social 
processes (e.g., argumentation, peer review, media processes) for achieving epistemic aims.” 
(Chinn et al., 2011, p. 163) 
It is to this that the following section turns – the socialising of both the object of inquiry 
(epistemic cognition), and the commensurate methodological approaches. As we note above 
with regard to Muis et al – this should not represent solely a shift in the scope of the construct 
‘epistemic cognition’, perhaps to include domain specificity, or bring under its purview the 
‘aims’ of inquiry for individuals. Thus, while the broadened scope of inquiry proposed by 
Chinn et al. is certainly important, to be theoretically coherent with the literature from which 
it draws this broadened scope should consider the wider social component of epistemology. 
Of particular interest is Chinn et al.,’s (ibid) suggestion that rather than theorising around 
‘epistemic beliefs’, we might instead refer to epistemic commitments (Chinn & Brewer, 
1993); a focus on “tendenc[ies] to act in specified ways, such as a proclivity to provide 
justifications based on personal experience” (Chinn et al., 2011, p. 146). 
In explicating our perspective on this issue we will first give a brief introduction to social 
epistemology. We note that, with the exception of Chinn et al (ibid), the epistemic cognition 
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literature thus far has not addressed recent developments around social epistemology. As we 
note above, this motivates a shift in both the object, and nature, of inquiry. When we act in 
the world, we are fundamentally engaging in social practices. Thus, in the subsequent section 
we highlight the ways in which epistemic cognitions – or commitments – may be understood 
as social, and analysed as such.  
3. Recent Developments in Social and Virtue Epistemologies 
As we note above, there has been recent philosophical interest in the kinds of ‘good’ 
practices associated with the acquisition of knowledge – epistemic virtues (see, Axtell, 2000; 
DePaul & Zagzebski, 2003; Roberts & Wood, 2007); and more generally the relationship of 
‘knowledge’ to our social nature and environment (see, Baehr, 2011; Goldberg, 2010; 
Goldman & Whitcomb, 2011; Haddock, Millar, & Pritchard, 2010), including a focus on 
testimony – and informant power statuses – as a source of knowledge (Fricker, 2009; 
Goldberg, 2010; Lackey, 2008; Lackey & Sosa, 2006) and the implications of these 
developments for education (see, Baehr, 2011; and in particular, Kotzee, 2013). 
This interest is motivated by a desire to understand how social ways of ‘knowing’ can 
be normative, while retaining weight beyond ‘mere’ belief (see, Goldman, 2010; and, Greco 
& Turri, 2013). By this we mean that social epistemology seeks to explain how claims of “I 
know x” are both bound up with the norms and practices of a social group, while maintaining 
that such claims can reflect facts about the world rather than relativistic beliefs. That is, 
attempting to explain how group normative standards can be understood as properties of 
those groups, and yet not be treated ‘equally’ (as in some relativistic perspectives). A 
particular focus of this work has been an interest in how one comes to ‘know’ through 
testimonial knowledge, that is, the circumstances under which I might claim knowledge of 
some thing, because you (an informant) have told me about it (see, Adler, 2014). There are 
also recent developments to apply such theorising to the use of technologies, prompting 
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questions such as “What do I know when I have pervasive access to an encyclopaedia?” 
under various theorised accounts of cognition including distributed cognition (for example, 
Palermos & Pritchard, 2013). Common to this work is an interest in understanding the 
conditions under which an agent’s capabilities confer knowledge, as opposed to ‘mere’ belief. 
That is, what environmental, social, capability, or justificatory method results in 
circumstances under which a special status – knowledge – is conferred on an agent’s true 
utterance, while in others that knowledge is considered more tentatively (as ‘belief’, true or 
otherwise). Such work has important implications for education given our desire to 
understand how learners gain knowledge from being presented, verbally, in written form, or 
via other media, with information. 
In the case of virtue epistemology this exploration has particularly focused on the types of 
intellectual characteristics associated with the reliable production of knowledge. A core 
interest of much of this broad work has been the analysis of how knowledge standards are 
maintained at both a micro level (what are the conditions under which I may claim 
‘knowledge’ from your testimony or my experience) and macro level (what are the conditions 
of ‘knowledge’ within this epistemic-group – what processes and practices should be 
displayed to indicate one has knowledge). This work has thus explored both the kinds of 
practices individuals should engage in when assessing knowledge claims from informants, 
and the kinds of signs or credibility-giving properties of ‘good’ informants.  
Of course, these concerns are of interest in epistemic cognition research too, 
particularly in its consideration of the conditions under which: authority, personal-knowledge 
or experience, or corroborative weight, in the sourcing of knowledge; and/or argument 
structure, evidential kind, or methodological process, in the justification of knowledge, lead 
to knowledge. 
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For the purposes of this work, we may remain agnostic regarding the specific virtue or 
social epistemological concepts and arguments around their scope. What is of interest here is 
the more general claim: that claims of ‘knowledge’ are normative, and that it is only by 
understanding the social context within which they are made that such claims can be 
understood. This marks a shift in the understanding of knowledge away from a delineation of 
its a priori constraints, such as the a priori conditions for ‘justification’ under a ‘Justified 
Truth Belief’ (JTB) model of knowledge. Instead, these approaches focus on a naturalised 
understanding of the ‘function’ of knowledge – as a socially deployed, mediated, and 
communicative construct (see particularly, Craig, 1999)1.  
Thus, while ‘traditional’ accounts of epistemology have been bound up with 
metaphysical ontic issues regarding the nature of the truth-world relationship and an agent’s 
access to it (broadly pertaining to the nature and source of knowledge respectively), recent 
social and pragmatic accounts refocus on the normative role of ‘knowledge’ as a 
communicative ends in pragmatic action – that is, how knowledge relates to our action as 
human doers. Thus, the pragmatic and social epistemological move is to cast epistemology in 
light of our social and situated position: that knowledge claims are made for a purpose, that 
they are action-oriented, and within particular normative contexts. Thus, while epistemic 
cognition research has typically characterised its conceptual target as the ‘nature of 
knowledge’ and ‘the source of knowledge’ (or, how one comes to know), a social 
characterisation of epistemology focuses on the following questions: (1) what functional role 
does ‘know’ play in an actor’s (social) environment and (2) what are the (justificatory, 
capability, or virtue) conditions on that knowledge?  
Note that this shift in focus is not an attempt to discard earlier epistemic cognition 
work, but rather to cast the foci of that work in light of their normative role, thus: (1) that 
                                                 
1 Some readers may see similarities here between ‘Communities of Practice’ (Lave & Wenger, 1991; Wenger, 1998) and the 
kind of social epistemology of interest here. For one discussion of a Deweyan social epistemology in this light see 
Garrison (1995).  
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how one comes to know is fundamentally tied up with the (social) purposes of knowledge; 
(2) one’s reliable belief forming capability should be normatively understood, and (arising 
from this); (3) one’s ability to integrate and evaluate testimony, including one’s own 
experience in; (4) particular epistemic contexts.  
This shift in focus is marked by an epistemological attention to reasons – which are 
fundamentally human and pragmatic in nature – over the kinds of justification  described in 
rationalist and empiricist models (through correspondence of claims to states of the world, the 
coherence of sets of beliefs into justificatory frames, and so on). That is, human action is seen 
in light of the normatively situated epistemically contextualized reasons for that action. This 
is in contrast to a perspective on action which views that action in terms of independently 
rational justificatory frames for motivation, belief, and knowledge. 
In their 2012 chapter, Kelly, McDonald and Wickman (2012) highlight three 
epistemological perspectives in science learning research: a normative-disciplinary 
perspective which focuses on practicing communities; a personal perspective focussing on 
internal representations and cognitive structures of learner’s personal views on truth, and 
education systems to examine these; and a social practices view which examines knowledge-
claims in the context of social-group negotiation. An aim of this current paper is to bring a 
version of these three perspectives together, motivated by our understanding of social 
epistemology in which individual cognition and representations (the middle perspective) are 
fundamentally mediated and mediating in the context of small group and wider social 
practices.   
There are thus three points of interest in our re-specification of epistemic cognition 
which tie together the five foci raised by Chinn, Buckland and Samarapungavan noted above. 
First, knowledge claims are pragmatic: Recent developments in social epistemology are clear 
that ‘to know’ (or, to claim that one knows) serves an action-oriented social function, and it is 
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from this point that analysis begins. Given the relationship between classical models of 
epistemology and epistemic cognition, this point is likely to have important consequences, 
particularly with regards to the kinds of normative judgements we make (“That student has a 
weak epistemic perspective, because s/he tends to authority” and so on) where such 
judgements require context sensitivity for the purpose for which knowledge is being sought 
or claimed. What separates this issue from what we characterise as a ‘cultural’ issue (2 
below), is that the claim that epistemic practices are pragmatic, is a meta-level claim. It is not 
a claim about specific cultural practices, but rather to say that if we wish to understand 
knowledge claims, we must understand them as pragmatic; we should ask the question: What 
functional role is ‘to know’ playing when you say you ‘know x’?. Commensurately, 
epistemic cognition research should investigate instances of actors (teachers, students, 
scientists, historians, etc.) claiming knowledge of some thing, and their purpose in doing so. 
Second, knowledge claims are normative. This is a macro, or cultural level point. That 
the occurrence of these normative practices takes place in domain-specific (science, history, 
maths, etc.) and cultural practices in which features of those cultures play a role in the 
specific epistemic practices engaged in; we should ask the question: What are the social and 
physical conditions which make an instance of ‘to know’ acceptable or unacceptable in this 
social group? Commensurately, epistemic cognition research should investigate the 
conditions – social, physical, justificatory – under which knowledge is ascribed to actors 
(teachers, students, scientists, historians, etc.) and the ways in which such groups are 
composed and distinguished2..  
Third, and finally, ‘knowledge’ claims are communicative. This is a micro or social 
level point. Of interest to this recent epistemological research is the ways in which learning 
occurs through the interactions, and within them. That is, how interaction both leads to 
                                                 
2 This focus aligns well with Gee’s description of ‘big D’ Discourses as normatively driven practices of being (and 
communicating) (Gee, 2012) 
15 
 
15 
 
epistemic stances being developed by individuals (that is, the interactions represent stances), 
and how those interactions co-construct stances. This latter claim again has implications for 
our unit of analysis in epistemic cognition research – analysis of and claims regarding 
individuals, even in situ, may not capture the co-constructive nature of epistemic stance; we 
should thus ask the question: What is the social unit trying to do collectively, and 
individually, when an instance of ‘I know’ is deployed? Commensurately, epistemic 
cognition research should investigate the micro-level interactional processes of sharing and 
building knowledge together within and across actors of varying standings (teachers, 
students, scientists, historians, etc.)3.. 
4. Socialising Epistemic Cognition 
The triad of foci noted above bears strong relationship to that discussed in van Dijk’s 
book ‘Discourse and Knowledge: A Sociocognitive approach’ (van Dijk, 2014)4 in which he 
notes – as do we – that there has thus far been relatively little psychological consideration of 
the role of discourse in understanding knowledge, nor of the socio-cognitive relationship to 
knowledge, its sharing and acquisition, with research tending to focus on persuasion and 
attitudes instead. In particular we note a shared philosophical literature underpinning both 
van Dijk’s and the social epistemological perspective we present. However, we note that van 
Dijk’s attention did not turn to the learning sciences literature, which is of core interest to our 
endeavour here, particularly with regard to the position that any approach to discourse and 
knowledge should be not just “contextual but also co-textual and interactional […because…] 
knowledge expressed in text and talk also depends on other, related discourses…” (van Dijk, 
2014, p. 404). Nor was van Dijk’s project concerned with the implications of such an analysis 
of discourse and knowledge for how we understand changes in the ways people talk about 
                                                 
3 This focus aligns well with Gee’s description of ‘little d’ discourse – language-in-use, as an interactive activity-oriented 
tool (Gee, 2012) 
4 Page numbers are given to the Kindle edition ‘locations’ 
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knowledge – conceptual change on a psychological level – a core concern for learning 
scientists, including ourselves. 
Paralleling the position outlined above, van Dijk takes a socio-cognitive approach, 
noting that “Knowledge on the one hand is socially construed, transmitted, shared and 
changed by communities, and on the other hand it is socially acquired and used by its 
individual members, especially also in socially situated discourse” (van Dijk, 2014, p. 4356). 
He thus highlights that neither individual cognitive analysis or interactionist analysis is 
adequate for the analysis of discourse and knowledge. In line with van Dijk (2014) we 
highlight that our account is of ‘epistemic cognition socialised’ to indicate not just a social-
learning perspective on epistemic cognition (in which the micro-interactional social features 
play a learning role), nor a social qua socialisation perspective on epistemic cognition (in 
which the macro-societal level features play a developmental role), but the interaction of the 
two. To extend this point, the socialised account goes beyond merely a scaffolded account of 
epistemic cognition, in which learners are brought into epistemic-cultures through their social 
interaction with more capable teachers or peers. Instead, we make the claim that a socialised 
account of epistemic cognition shifts the nature of the construct itself to include the social-
pragmatic features described above, and that this shift entails a commensurate focus on the 
social-interaction features of epistemic cognition (at the micro level) and a focus on the 
social-normative features of epistemic cognition (at the macro level). 
Human behaviour – including human epistemic behaviour – does not occur in a 
vacuum, it is constituted in and constitutive of interactions and such interaction is primarily 
linguistic in nature. As such, the current research agenda focussing on individual cognition, 
and – where the treatment of dialogue or talk is involved at all – interview or think-aloud 
data, is problematic insofar as it necessarily limits the scope of salient context. Such a 
tendency is likely to focus on dialogue as a representation of beliefs, with context provided 
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through physical environmental or domain features, reducing the role of dialogue from a tool 
to create and negotiate context anew in social interaction, to one to represent and be 
represented in given contexts. As Kärkkäinen (to whom we return shortly) notes: “stance in 
discourse is not the transparent linguistic packaging of ‘internal states’ of knowledge, but 
rather emerges from dialogic interaction” (Kärkkäinen, 2006, p. 699). Under an idealized 
perspective on the communicative properties of language the points raised here align well 
with a perspective of learning, sharing some history with discursive psychology. , This 
perspective notes that wherever learning is taking place, commonality is key, and language 
provides us with the social mode of thinking to build this ‘common knowledge’ as a resource 
for further communication, and joint action (Edwards & Mercer, 1987). Or as Mercer and 
Howe note, “To ‘know’ is to operate discursively within such a community [of practice]” 
(Mercer & Howe, 2012, p. 19), that is, knowledge is bound up in normative, communicative 
(discursive) practices.  
4.1 Methodological Implications of Epistemic Cognition Socialised 
We raise this shared perspective to highlight some of the common theoretical 
underpinnings of social epistemology, and sociocultural approaches, following for example 
Greeno, Collins and Resnick (1992). In so doing, we wish to highlight the important 
relationships between the theorised account of epistemic commitments, and the 
methodological shift to discourse. Of course, that knowledge is social is hardly a new claim 
in educational psychology (see, for example, Arievitch & Haenen, 2005; Barab, Hay, & 
Yamagata-Lynch, 2001; Pea, 1993; Säljö, 2009), but the focus of this paper, though aligned, 
is separate in highlighting how an account grounded in social epistemology shifts the focus of 
epistemic cognition research.  
Fundamentally, the social epistemological position motivates a greater attention to 
understanding knowledge as communicative, particularly given that: 
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epistemicity [of language] is a phenomenon that derives from the inherently 
dialogic nature of speech, that talk is always directed to a particular recipient or 
recipients within the sequential context of the turn-by-turn unfolding talk 
(Bakhtin, 1981; Voloshinov, 1973, Chapter 3). In such a view, subjectivity is no 
longer regarded as a more or less static mental state of the speaker, but a 
dynamic concept constructed in the course of some action; i.e., subjectivity is an 
integral part of the interaction between conversational co-participants 
(Kärkkäinen, 2006, p. 706).  
Of course, to some extent current approaches to epistemic cognition must consider 
social relations in any given learner’s epistemic cognition. The resources implicated in 
students’ learning – documents, teachers, other students, science experiments and so on – do 
not exist in a social vacuum. However, such features are often considered as ‘given’, and are 
not typically considered in the design of task paradigms or conceptual exegesis, nor studied 
(methodologically) except in highly controlled experimental conditions. Similarly, as 
Sandoval has noted (for example, Sandoval, 2005), a focus on experimental approaches to 
epistemic cognition can exclude the rich reasoning students engage in amongst themselves in 
attempting to solve problems in ways other than those the researcher might expect. 
A case, then, can be made for the socialising of epistemic cognition. The account outlined 
above, indicates that the standards for ‘knowing’ are driven by normative collective concerns 
regarding what one is trying to do in making knowledge claims in any given situation, this is 
social insofar as it involves both normative group practices, and social-communicative 
epistemic talk, which is targeted at some (pragmatic) ends. This consideration motivates: 
1. A shift in focus from a priori standards, to emergent standards for knowing. That is 
not, to be clear, a shift to relativistic standards for what it is to know, but rather a 
reflection that such standards are normatively driven, and are both constitutive of and 
emergent from group interaction. They are both dynamic and evolving, and 
socioculturally embedded and emergent.  
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2. A shift or refocussing in the unit of analysis towards collectives (such as small 
groups), both as the object of inquiry (i.e., the source of [collective] data regarding a 
given knowledge state or meta-knowledge state), and as the comparator (i.e., the 
epistemic-commitments of the groups of inquiry are compared to those of other 
groups).  
3. A shift in the methodological position from attempts to capture psychometric 
properties of individuals in de-contextualised settings, to analysis of construction of 
enacted epistemic-commitments in practice. Away from beliefs, and towards analysis 
of processes and products, with a perspective on epistemic cognition – as knowledge 
more broadly – as communicative, and co-constructed.  
Such a shift brings a number of benefits. Current epistemic cognition research has 
struggled to reconcile the general and specific context sensitivity of epistemic cognition – 
instances in which it might be said a particular belief is more or less sophisticated, whether 
beliefs are stable across contexts or vary, how we theorise learning from testimonial 
knowledge, and so on. Our socialised account addresses this struggle by providing a theorised 
approach in which such context sensitivity is explained with reference to the normative 
features of the pragmatic context. That is, a socialised account of epistemic cognition 
addresses some of the concerns of classic epistemic cognition research. 
Moreover an account of epistemic cognition drawn from social epistemology brings the 
construct of epistemic cognition into alignment with other socioculturally driven learning 
research, reconciling the social nature of individuals at both a small group and cultural level; 
issues largely absent from current epistemic cognition research. In drawing this alignment we 
highlight , for example, Wickman and Östman’s (2002; see also Wickman, 2004) 
sociocultural account of learning as discourse change, also bringing a commensurate shift in 
methods towards approaches to investigate interaction and discourse, which is grounded in 
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similar pragmatic philosophical theory. Our account thus shifts focus towards the emergent 
and co-constructed nature of epistemic cognition in situated contexts over self-report methods 
(interview, talk aloud, surveys, etc.); again we see benefits here in the potential exploration of 
interaction-based methods which are largely absent from current epistemic cognition research 
(although, see the following section). 
Finally, the expanded scope – taking an interest in testimony, the aims (pragmatic, and 
virtue oriented) of knowledge, and practices of achieving epistemic aims (over and above ‘the 
justification of knowledge’) – offers a fertile ground for future research agendas in the field. 
Understanding epistemic cognition in this way also foregrounds that the epistemic stances 
one takes may fulfil aims that are not solely epistemic; including in exerting or submitting to 
power, choosing to be more or less collaborative, and so on – a consideration that receives 
minimal attention (with regard to the authority of informants) in current epistemic cognition 
research. Within the scope of our socialised account, we thus see (as noted above) both an 
ability to explain the concerns of existing epistemic cognition research, and an extension of 
the constructs salient to such research. 
4.2 Evidence for a Socialised Account of Epistemic Cognition 
We have then proposed a shift in our understanding of epistemic cognition, to focus on 
knowledge as: 
1. Pragmatic, serving a social function, in which the question should be asked: What 
functional role is ‘to know’ playing when you say you ‘know x’?. 
2. Normative, a macro or cultural level point, indicating a focus on practices and the 
question: What are the social and physical conditions which make an instance of ‘to 
know’ acceptable or unacceptable in this social group? 
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3. Communicative, a micro or social level point, that knowledge is embedded in 
interaction, indicating the question: What is the social unit trying to do collectively, 
and individually, when an instance of ‘I know’ is deployed?  
We note that this triad of claims, motivated by our understanding of social epistemology, 
is supported by some – currently, disparately motivated – specific examples (given below) 
indicating that a re-specified account of epistemic cognition socialised provides an analysis of 
knowledge as: a normatively driven pragmatic feature; embedded in cultural practices; and 
communicative and intersubjective in nature. In the following section we highlight research 
aligned with a socialised account, but without a unified perspective. The social account of 
epistemic cognition presented herein proves one frame through which to bring these various 
perspectives into alignment, as we now outline..  
With regard particularly to the second – macro or cultural – point, that epistemic 
cognition is embedded in cultural practices, Sandoval (2012) has recently made similar 
claims, calling for epistemic cognition researchers to take seriously a ‘situated’ approach, 
building on similar theoretical foundations to this work. In that work the point is made that: 
One important way to understand the epistemic ideas that people bring to bear is 
to examine their participation in practices of knowledge evaluation and 
construction. Changes in the form of participation are indicators of changes in 
the meaning that individuals make of the activity in which they are 
engaged...Change in participation can indicate a shift in epistemic perspective, 
but it is the shift itself that suggests what particular epistemic ideas are brought to 
bear in the first place (Sandoval, 2012, p. 350) 
Similarly, arguably addressing the third – micro, discursive – element of knowledge as 
communicative and intersubjective, Österholm calls for a focus in epistemic cognition 
research on dialogue, using the approach of discursive psychology, which shares the same 
Wittgenstinian roots built on by social-epistemology. This perspective describes “the activity, 
the discourse, as the site where epistemological beliefs come to existence, through explicit or 
implicit references to prior experiences (epistemological resources)” (Österholm, 2009, p. 
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262), suggesting that we should not see beliefs and communication as “two separate ‘objects’ 
that can affect each other, but as more integrated aspects of cognition and/or behaviour” 
(Österholm, 2010, p. 242). Thus, the interest is not “what does it [language] represent? But, 
what is going on?” (Edwards, 1993, p. 218). 
Österholm argues that this discursive perspective is well aligned with the ‘resources’ 
model of epistemic cognition (Hammer & Elby, 2003) which views epistemic beliefs as 
inseparable from the resources available to the cognizer at any time; very arguably a core 
point for the first – pragmatic – point raised above. The emphasis of this perspective as 
“theory-in-action” – in which context, domain, culture, and task conditions interact – permits 
an important consideration of context-sensitivity. For example the finding from experimental 
epistemology research that stakes matter in the ascribing of knowledge (i.e., in higher stakes 
cases we require claimers to be more certain of their belief) (Beebe, 2014), alongside 
contextual cases that standard models of epistemic cognition may account for, for example 
that, “it is not very sophisticated to view the idea that the earth is round rather than flat as 
‘tentative’ whereas theories of dinosaur extinction do require a more tentative stance” 
(Barzilai & Zohar, 2012, p. 42).  
As Hyytinen, Holma, Toom, Shavelson, and Lindblom-Ylänne (2014) also note, the 
most sophisticated critical thinkers need to be able to come to conclusions – constant 
weighing of pros/cons is not epistemically sophisticated, also noting that assumed 
relationships between classical epistemological stances (realism, relativism) and epistemic-
cognition (belief in authority, a contextual perspective on authority) may not hold in students’ 
think aloud data. 
This is of interest. Very few studies to date have explored the use of language in action 
as a lens on epistemic cognition (although of course many use interviews or questionnaires). 
Yet, it is important to consider how language mediates and represents learner’s views on their 
23 
 
23 
 
learning. Hutchinson and Hammer (2010) provide a science classroom case study, illustrated 
by excerpts of the type seen in sociocultural discourse analysis, in which absolutist 
perspectives from students are given in contrast to more dialogic or sensemaking dialogue 
(or, as we discuss it below, ‘exploratory’ dialogue).. For example, in their excerpts, an 
illustration is given of a student’s explanation (Bekah) being taken up and referenced 
collectively by other students later in the discussion as “Bekah’s Law”. In the framing of this 
paper, that excerpt illustrates , the ways in which language can be both constituted in, and 
constitutive of, context – that is, contextually embedded, and forming a fundamental shaping 
force on that context – in this case through the repetition of a term that has taken on meaning 
for the collective (a ‘cohesive tie’)  (Hutchison & Hammer, 2010). 
Similarly, Rosenberg, Hammer and Phelan’s (2006) study can be framed in terms of 
our socialised perspective. In the article describing that research,,  a case study was presented 
of a 15 minute discussion of the ‘rock cycle’ by a group of 8th graders – again, making use of 
dialogue excerpts to illustrate the epistemic processes undertaken. Rosenberg et al., (2006) 
note that in the initial stages students were engaged in largely unproductive talk (there was 
some accretion of knowledge, with little explanation or evidence of understanding – it was 
largely cumulative in nature), suggesting this was because: "They [were] treating knowledge 
as comprised of isolated, simple pieces of information expressed with specific vocabulary 
and provided by authority" (Rosenberg et al., 2006, p. 270). After a brief intervention by the 
teacher, suggesting the students might build on their own knowledge, this talk instead shifted 
to more productive dialogue, with students seeking coherence and understanding in their 
attempts to create a theory and use terms they understood. As with Hutchison and Hammer’s 
study above, this latter type of dialogue (which we might characterise as ‘exploratory’) 
indicates attempts to co-constructe perspectives on knowledge, indicating the micro-level 
discursive nature of epistemic cognition. 
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Students’ framing of activities as the production of answers for the teacher or test, as 
opposed to gaining understanding, implies a particular epistemic stance towards their 
education (Hutchison & Hammer, 2010). And indeed, such perspectives may be observable 
in the behaviours of collaborative groups (Scherr & Hammer, 2009). This is true of both free-
form spoken dialogue, and the use of collaborative knowledge building tools which through 
their scaffolding features may not only encourage higher levels of engagement, but also 
greater collaboration, reflection, and a shift to more constructivist epistemological beliefs 
(see Hong & Lin, 2010 for evidence in teacher trainees). Indeed, some of this framing is non-
epistemic in nature, time, resources, and social constraints are important considerations which 
vary across context (Kawasaki, DeLiema, & Sandoval, 2014); these factors have important 
pragmatic and normative implications (the first point raised above) with regard to appropriate 
epistemic practices. 
However, what is lacking from analysis of dialogue in these prior studies is a 
consideration of the normative features of the dialogue in use. The type of dialogue used is 
discussed, but why a particular type of dialogue might be related to a particular (desired) 
educational outcome is largely undiscussed. However, these types of dialogue are not simply 
pedagogic tools (about which we might be agnostic were it not for the epistemically-related 
outcomes) but learning tools in their own right. Social elements of learning, most crucially 
dialogue, do not just represent learning states, they create them co-constructively and 
iteratively. 
The epistemic cognition literature which deals with philosophical approaches has, thus 
far, tended to explore what that philosophical literature tells us about the scope of 
‘epistemology’ (i.e., what features or targets of inquiry it relates to – largely the source or 
justification of knowledge), but not its internal structure (i.e., how those features relate to 
each other, and the implications of this for inquiry). To put it another way, with the exception 
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of the preliminary (and ongoing) discussions noted here, most research thus far has, where 
philosophy is considered at all, considered it in a descriptive role (“What is epistemology”). It 
has not, however, considered philosophy’s explanatory (“Why – philosophically – this 
evidence is taken to provide knowledge?”) or normative roles (“Why this evidentiary 
standard is taken to be – epistemically – ‘better’ than that one?”). This omission has in large 
part excluded the communicative nature of ‘knowledge’ claims from the attention of 
epistemic cognition researchers. The approach we propose holds a number of benefits in 
terms of developing a coherent perspective of epistemic cognition drawing on the extant 
philosophical literature. In addition, it addresses many of the concerns currently highlighted 
in the epistemic cognition literature, for example regarding domain specificity of beliefs, 
normative standards (often characterised in terms of ‘naïve’ versus ‘sophisticated’ epistemic 
beliefs), and of course the very scope of the construct (encompassing ontological concerns, 
etc.).  
4.3 A Proposal for Epistemic Commitments in Learning Dialogue 
In the preceding section (p.17) we briefly introduced the notion of ‘common 
knowledge’: the body of shared contextual knowledge which is built up through discourse 
and joint action, and forms the basis for further communication (Edwards & Mercer, 1987; 
Littleton & Mercer, 2013). Furthermore, as van Dijk notes, text and talk are critical to 
understanding culture both because they represent, and are constituted through, discourse 
(van Dijk, 2014). Given the social epistemological account, it is clear that wherever 
knowledge claims are made, common knowledge, the shared mutual and co-constructed 
understanding of what is being said, is key. This is because such claims occur in a social 
context, they require others’ understanding to be knowledge claims, and they require an 
understanding of a shared body of knowledge to be well formed as such.  
26 
 
26 
 
Of course, common knowledge is equally important in a variety of cases of coming to 
know (or, learning), and indeed even in the case of what might traditionally have been 
conceptualised as ‘transfer’ of knowledge from a knower to a learner (‘testimonial 
knowledge’) it would be an impoverished view of learning to view the learning states as 
simple transfer from one individual to another (Knight & Littleton, 2015). In this paper, our 
interest is in students’ conceptual frames for such learning – the ways epistemic-cognition 
shapes perspectives on what is to be learnt – and here too, understanding the communicative 
nature of learning is important, and presently underexplored by epistemic cognition literature.  
We have found Kärkkäinen’s work on intersubjective stance taking (Kärkkäinen, 2006) 
particularly instructive in our thinking on this topic. As Kärkkäinen notes:   
We do not express our evaluations, attitudes or affective states in a vacuum; 
participants in discourse do not merely act, but interact. They achieve 
intersubjective understandings of the ongoing conversation as they display their 
own understanding (their subjectivities, if you like) in their sequentially next 
turns, while correcting or confirming those of their co-participants (Kärkkäinen, 
2006, p. 704) 
By epistemic stance, Kärkkäinen means “marking the degree of commitment to what 
one is saying, or marking attitudes toward knowledge. This definition also includes evidential 
distinctions, or how knowledge was obtained and what kind of evidence the speaker provides 
for it” (Kärkkäinen, 2006, p. 705); such markers include ‘I think’, ‘he’ or ‘she’ said, ‘I don’t 
know’ ‘I guess’, ‘I thought’, epistemic adverbs such as ‘maybe’, ‘probably’, ‘apparently’, ‘of 
course’, and epistemic modal auxiliaries such as ‘would’, ‘must’, ‘might’, ‘could’, ‘will’, 
‘may’. As Kärkkäinen highlights, understanding of such utterances has typically been seen 
from an individual perspective, as a static representation of interior states of speakers; it is her 
argument that instead, we should start with an analysis of actions ‘to do’ in interactive 
contexts, taking stance to be emergent from sequential interactive contexts. “Thus, stance is 
more properly viewed from an intersubjective vantage point, rather than being regarded as a 
primarily subjective dimension of language.” (Kärkkäinen, 2006, p. 700). The implication, 
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then, is that positioning towards knowledge claims is not a feature of individual language or 
cognition, but in-relation to other linguistic expressions and speakers; that epistemic stance 
emerges through the ways people talk and interact together, jointly. 
Our claim is that the kind of ‘stance’ described by Kärkkäinen viewed in light of the 
philosophical social-epistemology described above, motivates an analysis of particular 
classes of discourse that might be described as epistemic in nature. We suggest that the 
analysis of discourse, in context, over time, is the site through which student’s epistemic 
commitments are brought to bear. Such commitments might be thought of as the tendencies – 
with no assumptions regarding underlying cognitive attitude implied – of epistemic stances. 
That is, we see an epistemic commitment as the repetition of connections between particular 
epistemic modes of discourse and contexts in which they occur. We use the word 
commitment here, following on from Chinn et al., (2011), Knight, Arastoopour, Williamson 
Shaffer, Buckingham Shum, & Littleton (2014), and Wu and Tsai’s description of 
information commitments (C.-C. Tsai, 2004; Wu & Tsai, 2005) in order to foreground our 
position that, through our actions – encompassing the discursive stances we take – we 
commit to particular ways of seeing, and dealing with, the world; our epistemic 
commitments. This perspective accords with Chinn et al.,’s (2011)  suggestion of ‘epistemic 
commitments’ as behaviouristic traits in contrast to tacit ‘beliefs’. However, in agreeing, we 
intend to expand the potential unit of analysis away from individualised accounts of 
epistemic commitments as tendencies to act in such and such a way, favouring an approach 
which accounts for small-group analysis and the social circumstances in which epistemic 
commitments are played out. That is, our perspective shifts away from individuals to social 
units, and from individual-behavioural tendencies, to small group behavioural traits and 
socially contextualised accounts of that behaviour.  
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4.4 Implications for Learning Contexts 
Core to the account we have outlined is that the consideration of epistemic cognition 
socialised involves an analysis of the ways in which contextual features of our environments 
– including our dialogue, which we take to be a core feature of, and resource for context – 
come together to shape our epistemic commitments.  
A central interest of our approach lies in understanding how contextual features 
combine. For example, in understanding the circumstances under which one is justified in 
claiming knowledge from an informant (testimonial knowledge) an understanding of a set of 
features around authority-establishing, argumentation-schema, corroboration, and prior 
knowledge integration are key. One way in which such context is salient is in the normative-
communicative context in which speakers are ‘required’ to inform some recipient of their 
knowledge (a teacher, a priest, a struggling child, and so on) (van Dijk, 2014). 
Indeed, we see parallels here between such stances, and the kind of epistemic dialogue we 
discuss further below which Reznitskaya and Gregory (2013) recently discussed in relation to 
epistemic cognition (in conceptual change). In that article, they point out that the sort of 
dialogic talk related to exploratory talk (described in Wegerif, 2006) stands in stark contrast 
to the kinds of ‘monologism’ described by Bakhtin (1984) in which dialogue portends to 
readymade and singular truth. In doing so, they elaborate theory which is in strong accord 
with that described above. They point out (p.118-119) that dialogic learning contexts are: 
1. About recognising expertise and its limits – that is, authoritativeness is respected, but 
not unquestioningly so.  
2. Centred on divergent questions – that is, ill structured questions about which there are 
different perspectives are key.  
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3. Metacognitive in nature, involving both products and processes, awareness of others – 
that is, student must consider ‘the other’, consider how they themselves come to know 
and do so in the context of their tools and outputs. 
Reznitskaya and Gregory (2013) suggest that epistemic cognition of an ‘evaluativist’ kind 
– which they hold to be more sophisticated – is closely associated with the kind of 
exploratory talk associated with educational gains. Mercer and colleagues have extensively 
researched such dialogue, developed an intervention strategy called ‘Thinking Together’, and 
highlighted a particular form of productive dialogue which, adapting the term from Douglas 
Barnes’ (Barnes & Todd, 1977) original broadly individualistic description, they have termed 
‘exploratory’5, in which in contrast to cumulative or disputational talk: 
Partners engage critically but constructively with each other’s ideas. Statements 
and suggestions are offered for joint consideration. These may be challenged and 
counter-challenged, but challenges are justified and alternative  hypotheses 
are offered. Partners all actively participate, and opinions are sought and 
considered before decisions are jointly made. Compared with the other two types, 
in exploratory talk knowledge is made more publicly accountable and reasoning 
is more visible in the talk. (Mercer & Littleton, 2007, pp. 58–59) 
Similar characterisations of effective dialogue have emerged from the work of other 
researchers across a range of ages (Michaels, O’Connor, Hall, & Resnick, 2002; Resnick, 
2001). In this research, Accountable Talk is described as encompassing three broad 
dimensions: 
1. accountability to the learning community, in which participants listen to and build 
their contributions in response to those of others;  
2. accountability to accepted standards of reasoning, talk that emphasizes logical 
connections and the drawing of reasonable conclusions; and,  
                                                 
5 To be clear, this is not just a theorised account, the strong consensus among researchers is that in a variety of contexts, high 
quality dialogue is associated with learning (see the collection edited by Littleton and Howe (2010)). That research shows 
that, “Engaging children in extended talk which encourages them to ‘interthink’ and explain themselves…stimulates both 
their subject learning, and general reasoning skills (Mercer, Dawes, Wegerif, & Sams, 2004; Mercer, Wegerif, & Dawes, 
1999; Mercer & Sams, 2006; Rojas-Drummond, Littleton, Hernández, & Zúñiga, 2010), as well as their social and language 
skills (Wegerif, Littleton, Dawes, Mercer, & Rowe, 2004)” (Knight, 2013). 
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3. accountability to knowledge, talk that is based explicitly on facts, written texts, or 
other public information. (Michaels, O’Connor, & Resnick, 2008, p. 283) 
As with the typology of talk developed by Mercer and colleagues, the emphasis of 
Accountable Talk is not on learning particular subject or topic knowledge and language, but 
rather on learning to engage with other’s ideas, and in doing so use skills of explanation and 
reasoning, learning to use language as a tool for thinking and interthinking (for example, 
Littleton & Mercer, 2013). 
In the context of learning, the kinds of languages we expect students to engage in are 
those precisely met by accountable or exploratory dialogue. Thus, our claim is that 
exploratory dialogue – the kind of dialogue associated with common knowledge – is likely to 
be a necessary but not sufficient component in our understanding of epistemic cognition in 
learning contexts. In these types of talk the interlocutors: 
1. Emphasise learning from, and listening to others 
2. Have a commitment to expressing, and explaining their ideas 
3. A respect for the standards or practices of the community, using the appropriate type 
of argument in discourse 
Our own account of epistemic commitments thus follows Reznitskaya and Gregory’s 
analysis of dialogic talk in the context of conceptual change. However, we note that their 
analysis of epistemic cognition focuses on the developmental classificatory system of Kuhn 
(1991) in which learners develop from absolutists, to multiplists, to evaluativists. While the 
theme of epistemic development is related here, concerns with the epistemological 
assumptions underlying this approach to epistemic cognition – and its corresponding 
methodological implications – were raised above (and indeed, by Reznitskaya and Gregory, 
pp.125-6).  
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The socialised account of epistemic cognition that we present is motivated by a theorised 
account of epistemology, and which – as we indicate in section 4.2 -  can frame the existing 
extant body of work on epistemic cognition. The account we provide, then, has at its core the 
claims that: 
1. As we describe in the section ‘Recent Developments in Social and Virtue 
Epistemologies’, knowledge claims are pragmatic, normative, and communicative, 
2. As we describe in the section ‘Socialising Epistemic Cognition’, knowledge claims 
should thus be understood as emergent from and constitutive of (normative) social 
groups, necessitating a refocussing on collectives in our understanding of knowledge 
claims, and the commensurate methodological implication towards a focus on group 
processes rather than cognitive-constructs. 
The argument, then, is that: 
1. Epistemic commitments are seen in emergent and co-constructed interactions between 
members of a social group  
2. What makes these epistemic, and of interest to us as educational psychologists 
scientists, is their pragmatic force – that the learners are doing something in implicitly 
or explicitly making knowledge claims, and the ways in which they do that 
3. We thus see a re-specification, but not a discarding of, existing epistemic cognition 
work – the constructs referred to, the ways we talk about the epistemic are 
fundamentally bound up with the ways students use epistemic-language to make and 
make sense of knowledge claims  
What is key in this account is that the language used provides ways of treating 
information, and informants. Stance taking can thus be characterised as: 
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an interactive activity engaged in by co-participants in conversation, rather than 
being an isolated mental activity of an individual speaker. When making a 
concluding assessment of the preceding story, speakers display an orientation 
toward involving recipients in the assessment activity, and recipients generally 
join in to negotiate a shared stance toward, and an understanding of, the story or 
some aspect of the story. But such joint stance taking is not only a form of 
participation in the reception of a story, it is often simultaneously a negotiation of 
some underlying social norm or value implicit in the story (Kärkkäinen, 2006, pp. 
723–724) 
And in our position, the repetition of such stance can be seen as an epistemic 
commitment. Thus, language is both constitutive of, and constituted in, epistemic stances; the 
ways these are brought to bear on particular epistemic features constitute epistemic 
commitments. We are, in this context, particularly interested in learning dialogue. The 
everyday scientific discourse of science-professionals is likely to be different to this 
(although of course, would no doubt involve mutual learning encounters too). In this learning 
context there are good theoretical and empirical reasons for supposing the kind of dialogue 
we describe above is associated with the ‘taking on’ of knowledge. This is more than just 
‘learning’ qua transfer; we do not just gain knowledge – in order for such gains to be made 
one must be receptive to that knowledge, and it is this active receptiveness that we are 
interested in as a form of epistemic commitment, and which we associate with ‘common 
knowledge’ above. 
5. Conclusions: Epistemic Cognition – The Socialised Account 
This paper has outlined a new, social, account of epistemic cognition, bringing 
together recent work in social epistemology alongside some existing epistemic cognition 
research. The aim of the paper is not, to be clear, to suggest that we should disregard existing 
theory, but rather to broaden its conceptual and methodological scope to recognise the 
sociocultural components of epistemic cognition. Furthermore, the claim we are making here 
is not, to be clear, that epistemic cognition can or should be reduced to the presence or lack 
thereof of exploratory or accountable dialogue. Clearly, what researchers are trying to ‘get at’ 
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when they do epistemic cognition research, expands beyond the use of one type of dialogue 
or another. Indeed, we would agree with Säljö, who notes an overreliance on static or given 
‘thing like’ metaphors in cognitive models of human learning, which thus de-emphasise the 
ways in which learning occurs through interaction with the environment (Säljö, 2002, p. 402). 
Understanding the multitude of ways in which learners develop their epistemic capabilities is 
thus particularly important given the potential that, while students are not engaged in the 
kinds of action we – as researchers, and assessors of ‘scientific’ behaviour – think are 
epistemically productive, that is not to say the students are not engaged in rather 
sophisticated, contextually salient, epistemic behaviour (for example, Sandoval, 2005, 2012).  
We argue for a socialised account of epistemic cognition in which the construct itself 
is understood as fundamentally socioculturally co-constructed, and instances of ‘epistemic 
cognizing’ are seen as involving both individuals (in social, possibly social-learning) 
contexts, and the broad social settings that learners act within. As such, the ‘conflicting’ 
perspectives between a cognitive perspective – of knowledge as possession – and the 
sociocultural perspective – of knowledge as “belonging, participating, and communicating” 
(Mason, 2007, p. 3) are, we argue, brought to a shared headwater in a socialised account.  
Indeed in describing a sociocultural account of knowledge as “belonging, participating, and 
communicating”, Mason (ibid), was introducing a special issue on “bridging the cognitive 
and sociocultural approaches in research on conceptual change” in which Greeno and van de 
Sande (2007) propose “that a bridge between the cognitive and sociocultural approaches can 
be built simultaneously from both sides in a more symmetrical way than in previous efforts” 
(Mason, 2007, p. 5). Their proposal is for an understanding of learning which builds in 
contextual features of activities through “perspectival understanding” which can introduce 
constraints on the satisfaction of task requirements. As the articles in that special issue 
highlight (and in particular the commentaries by Mercer (2007) and moreover Alexander 
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(2007), the issue here is not only the theorised account of conceptual change qua the 
developmental process of conceptual change, but a theorised account of just what conceptual 
change is qua construct. Such an understanding should reflect the epistemological context of 
the sociocultural and cognitive perspectives on learning and conceptual change (Alexander, 
2007); that is our endeavour here, building on recent philosophical literature in epistemology. 
As Alexander notes “To extend Greeno and van de Sande’s [ibid] metaphor: A river without 
two banks ceases to be a river” (Alexander, 2007, p. 69); however our account, in contrast to 
that proposed by Greeno and van de Sande, offers a mapping of the terrain which makes it 
clear that the sociocultural and cognitive banks of the river come to a shared headwater – that 
is, that both perspectives stem from the same source, they are connected, and it is here that 
the object of inquiry should be focussed. We go further, suggesting that to bridge the banks 
we should understand their shared geology, the natural environment from which they emerge, 
a pragmatic understanding of knowledge, carving those banks out. We thus take an explicitly 
pragmatic perspective on epistemology, noting that knowledge is purposeful, it occurs in a 
natural environment, and serves a functional role in that environment (see, for example, 
Frega, 2011). In considering the roles of the cognitive, and social – the ‘banks’ of the river – 
we should not forget this shared, pragmatic, headstream; individuals cognize in social 
contexts, situated in a material world. 
We have argued for a greater attention to the social, discursive, nature of epistemic 
cognition. It is not just a call to explore the types of dialogue which occur in epistemic 
contexts more – although for sure that would be a valuable pursuit – rather, it is a call for 
deeper theorising around and study of the discursive properties of epistemic talk, the 
communicative acts, the ways meaning is shared and co-constructed (or not), the resources 
deployed, and the reasons that people and resources are taken as good or poor informants. 
This language is orienting in nature, and it is to that which we call for further attention. This 
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is motivated in this paper by our account of social epistemology, which is fundamentally 
social in nature. We use the word ‘fundamentally’ here quite deliberately, to highlight the 
shared headwaters of individual-cognitivist models of epistemic-cognition, and sociocultural 
situated models of the same; our argument has been that these banks of the river, that shape 
and direct our epistemic-activities stem from a shared – fundamentally social – environment. 
The mode of primary interaction in this environment is linguistic, and it is through our – 
primarily language-based – tool-mediated interactions that we bring to bear knowledge 
claims and evaluations.  
 ‘Exploratory talk’ describes one relatively simple communicative stance that learners 
might take. But it does not describe the things about which we take a stance – the targets of 
those stances. Understanding these targets is fundamental to developing a deeper 
understanding of epistemic cognition as a socioculturally situated discursive and 
communicative practice. This is in line with Goodyear and Zenios’ argument for an “action-
oriented conception of learning in higher education” (Goodyear & Zenios, 2007, p. 351), 
bringing together epistemic activity and epistemic fluency, in which discussion and 
collaborative activity is seen as a fundamental component of developing epistemic fluency, as 
achieved in and demonstrated through epistemic activities. That is, they claim that by 
engaging in the discourse of a community, while undertaking the tasks (the epistemic, 
knowledge oriented, tasks) of those communities, students develop epistemic fluency, the 
“ability to recognise and practice a variety of epistemic games […] epistemic fluency allows 
one to recognise, appreciate and understand the subtlety and complexity of a belief system 
that one has not encountered before” (Goodyear & Zenios, 2007, p. 358).  
Such contexts are frequent in learning contexts – including formal education. As Furberg 
(2009) notes,  
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students’ talk and interaction while engaging with Web-based learning 
environments constitute a possible entrance for understanding how they actually 
make sense of and employ prompts as structuring resources in their learning 
processes. During interaction, participants constantly make meanings and 
interpretations of situations, events and actions visible and observable to other 
participants as well as for us as analysts (Linell, 1998; Mercer, 2004) (Furberg, 
2009, p. 400). 
The kinds of ‘openness’ exhibited in dialogic, exploratory, and accountable talk are crucially 
epistemic in nature. This claim suggests that – in line with calls from other researchers – a 
greater focus is needed on high quality discourse in learning settings. More broadly, this 
paper has argued for a perspective on epistemic cognition, grounded in recent philosophical 
work, which starts from an understanding of the normative, intersubjective, practices in 
which people engage when they build and claim knowledge. Such a perspective motivates a 
shift to analysis of collectives (small and larger groups), engaged in activity oriented 
communicative acts through which researchers may probe epistemic commitments, both as 
they relate to and are constructed through particular contexts, and as they relate to alternative 
contexts, settings, or cultures. To highlight, our argument is not that such an account of 
‘epistemic cognition socialised’ is of ‘coming in to communities of expertise’, or of 
‘scaffolding’ individual’s capabilities – both macro level analysis of practices, and micro 
level analysis of interactions is crucial to our understanding. Thus, we have argued that these 
elements of understanding epistemic cognition stem from the same headwater – that people 
claim knowledge in social and material environments, and that such claims are pragmatically 
oriented. This understanding of epistemology motivates and parallels our proposal for a 
socialised account of epistemic cognition, which as we outline, aligns with, and draws 
together, some existing socially-oriented accounts of epistemic cognition providing a fertile 
ground for further research. 
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